feat: OpenMesh 基础平台与 MD/PDF 转换技能

- 后端: coworker 智能体框架, WS API, 文件上传, 附件处理
- 前端: Open WebUI, 文件全量走 upload API (含 MD/TXT/JSON 等文本类)
- 技能: md-to-office (pandoc + wkhtmltopdf)
- 修复: 上传文件路径丢失, Agent 搜索浪费, 输出文件跑到 uploads/
- 打包: PyInstaller one-dir, 预打包 pandoc/wkhtmltopdf/chromium

coworker/personas/builtin/cloud-posture/skills/aws-posture/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: aws-posture
+description: Read-only AWS posture check — public exposure, IAM blast radius, hygiene
+---
+Check the live AWS account's security posture using strictly read-only CLI calls, then
+fix root causes in the IaC.
+
+HARD RULE: read-only means read-only — describe/list/get/simulate calls only. No
+create/put/update/delete/attach, no `terraform apply`, ever. If a fix is needed, it goes
+into Terraform for the team to apply.
+
+1. Confirm access and scope: `aws sts get-caller-identity` (mask the account id to its
+   last 4 digits in anything you write). Ask which regions matter; default to the ones
+   the Terraform state uses.
+2. Sweep the high-signal surfaces, most exposed first:
+   - Public entry points: S3 buckets (`get-public-access-block`, bucket policies),
+     security groups open to 0.0.0.0/0 on sensitive ports, public RDS/ES endpoints,
+     ALB listeners without TLS.
+   - IAM blast radius: users with attached admin policies, wildcard `Action`/`Resource`
+     in customer-managed policies, stale access keys (`iam get-credential-report`),
+     roles with overly broad trust policies.
+   - Hygiene: CloudTrail on and multi-region, default EBS/S3 encryption, root-account
+     MFA (from the credential report).
+3. Cross-reference each finding against the repo's Terraform: is the risky config
+   defined in code (fix it there), drifted from code (flag the drift), or unmanaged
+   (propose importing it)?
+4. Deliver: an exposure-ranked posture report (finding · resource · evidence command ·
+   where it's defined · action), the IaC fix branch for what's code-managed, and a
+   short list of items needing a human decision. Every claim carries the exact
+   read-only command that evidences it, so the team can re-run and verify.

coworker/personas/builtin/cloud-posture/skills/iac-scan/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: iac-scan
+description: Scan Terraform/IaC with trivy config and fix what matters in code
+---
+Scan the repo's infrastructure-as-code and turn findings into minimal, safe Terraform
+changes.
+
+1. Pick the scanner (in this order — do NOT skip the scan if none is present):
+   - `trivy config . --format json -o /tmp/iac.json` (also covers Dockerfiles/k8s)
+   - `checkov -d . -o json > /tmp/iac.json` if the repo already uses it
+   - Neither installed: ask for trivy with `request_tool("trivy", …)`. If the user
+     declines, review the Terraform by hand against the exposure checklist in step 2
+     and say in your report that the scan was manual.
+   Do not suggest tfsec — it is deprecated; `trivy config` is its successor.
+2. Triage by real exposure, reading the surrounding Terraform for each finding:
+   - Internet-reachable (0.0.0.0/0 ingress, public buckets/ALBs) first.
+   - Then identity blast radius (wildcard IAM, broad assume-role trust).
+   - Then encryption/logging hygiene.
+   Mark deliberate-looking configuration (a public website bucket, a bastion SG) as
+   "intentional?" and ask rather than auto-fix.
+3. Fix in the module where the resource is DEFINED (follow module sources), matching
+   the repo's Terraform style — variables, locals, and tags the way the codebase
+   already does them.
+4. Validate every change: `terraform fmt` on touched files, then `terraform init
+   -backend=false && terraform validate` when possible. Include `terraform plan`
+   output in the PR when the user can run it — NEVER run `terraform apply`.
+5. Deliver: exposure-ranked findings table (resource · issue · verdict · action), the
+   fix branch/PR, and any "intentional?" items awaiting a human decision. Offer a
+   pinned scanner config (e.g. `.trivyignore` with justifications) only for findings
+   the team explicitly accepts.