feat: OpenMesh 基础平台与 MD/PDF 转换技能
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- 后端: coworker 智能体框架, WS API, 文件上传, 附件处理
- 前端: Open WebUI, 文件全量走 upload API (含 MD/TXT/JSON 等文本类)
- 技能: md-to-office (pandoc + wkhtmltopdf)
- 修复: 上传文件路径丢失, Agent 搜索浪费, 输出文件跑到 uploads/
- 打包: PyInstaller one-dir, 预打包 pandoc/wkhtmltopdf/chromium
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2026-09-13 23:41:04 +08:00
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---
name: aws-posture
description: Read-only AWS posture check — public exposure, IAM blast radius, hygiene
---
Check the live AWS account's security posture using strictly read-only CLI calls, then
fix root causes in the IaC.
HARD RULE: read-only means read-only — describe/list/get/simulate calls only. No
create/put/update/delete/attach, no `terraform apply`, ever. If a fix is needed, it goes
into Terraform for the team to apply.
1. Confirm access and scope: `aws sts get-caller-identity` (mask the account id to its
last 4 digits in anything you write). Ask which regions matter; default to the ones
the Terraform state uses.
2. Sweep the high-signal surfaces, most exposed first:
- Public entry points: S3 buckets (`get-public-access-block`, bucket policies),
security groups open to 0.0.0.0/0 on sensitive ports, public RDS/ES endpoints,
ALB listeners without TLS.
- IAM blast radius: users with attached admin policies, wildcard `Action`/`Resource`
in customer-managed policies, stale access keys (`iam get-credential-report`),
roles with overly broad trust policies.
- Hygiene: CloudTrail on and multi-region, default EBS/S3 encryption, root-account
MFA (from the credential report).
3. Cross-reference each finding against the repo's Terraform: is the risky config
defined in code (fix it there), drifted from code (flag the drift), or unmanaged
(propose importing it)?
4. Deliver: an exposure-ranked posture report (finding · resource · evidence command ·
where it's defined · action), the IaC fix branch for what's code-managed, and a
short list of items needing a human decision. Every claim carries the exact
read-only command that evidences it, so the team can re-run and verify.

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---
name: iac-scan
description: Scan Terraform/IaC with trivy config and fix what matters in code
---
Scan the repo's infrastructure-as-code and turn findings into minimal, safe Terraform
changes.
1. Pick the scanner (in this order — do NOT skip the scan if none is present):
- `trivy config . --format json -o /tmp/iac.json` (also covers Dockerfiles/k8s)
- `checkov -d . -o json > /tmp/iac.json` if the repo already uses it
- Neither installed: ask for trivy with `request_tool("trivy", …)`. If the user
declines, review the Terraform by hand against the exposure checklist in step 2
and say in your report that the scan was manual.
Do not suggest tfsec — it is deprecated; `trivy config` is its successor.
2. Triage by real exposure, reading the surrounding Terraform for each finding:
- Internet-reachable (0.0.0.0/0 ingress, public buckets/ALBs) first.
- Then identity blast radius (wildcard IAM, broad assume-role trust).
- Then encryption/logging hygiene.
Mark deliberate-looking configuration (a public website bucket, a bastion SG) as
"intentional?" and ask rather than auto-fix.
3. Fix in the module where the resource is DEFINED (follow module sources), matching
the repo's Terraform style — variables, locals, and tags the way the codebase
already does them.
4. Validate every change: `terraform fmt` on touched files, then `terraform init
-backend=false && terraform validate` when possible. Include `terraform plan`
output in the PR when the user can run it — NEVER run `terraform apply`.
5. Deliver: exposure-ranked findings table (resource · issue · verdict · action), the
fix branch/PR, and any "intentional?" items awaiting a human decision. Offer a
pinned scanner config (e.g. `.trivyignore` with justifications) only for findings
the team explicitly accepts.