feat: OpenMesh 基础平台与 MD/PDF 转换技能

- 后端: coworker 智能体框架, WS API, 文件上传, 附件处理
- 前端: Open WebUI, 文件全量走 upload API (含 MD/TXT/JSON 等文本类)
- 技能: md-to-office (pandoc + wkhtmltopdf)
- 修复: 上传文件路径丢失, Agent 搜索浪费, 输出文件跑到 uploads/
- 打包: PyInstaller one-dir, 预打包 pandoc/wkhtmltopdf/chromium

tests/test_conversation_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+"""ConversationStore: session id path-traversal hardening.
+
+A session id becomes a filename ("<id>.jsonl"); ids arrive from client-controlled
+surfaces (the /ws/session/{id} route, REST paths), so a crafted id must never let a
+write or read escape the conversations/ directory.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from coworker.conversations import ConversationStore, is_safe_session_id
+from coworker.sessions import SessionRecord
+
+
+def test_is_safe_session_id():
+    # Every id shape the app actually generates is accepted.
+    for ok in (
+        "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",  # uuid4().hex
+        "abc123def456",  # uuid4().hex[:12]
+        "__run__run-abcdef1234",  # automation run thread
+        "__task__task-0123456789",  # automation task thread
+    ):
+        assert is_safe_session_id(ok), ok
+    # Anything that could escape a single path component is rejected.
+    for bad in (
+        "../evil",
+        "../../etc/passwd",
+        "a/b",
+        "a\\b",
+        "..",
+        ".",
+        "with space",
+        "dot.dot",
+        "",
+        "x" * 129,  # over the length cap
+    ):
+        assert not is_safe_session_id(bad), bad
+
+
+def test_save_rejects_traversal_id_without_writing_outside(tmp_path):
+    """The verified vuln: saving a record with '../evil' used to create 'evil.jsonl'
+    OUTSIDE the conversations dir. It must raise and write nothing."""
+    store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+    rec = SessionRecord(
+        session_id="../evil",
+        workspace=str(tmp_path),
+        model="m",
+        mode="interactive",
+        messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        store.save(rec)
+    # Nothing landed outside conversations/ (the previous behavior wrote here).
+    assert not (tmp_path / "state" / "evil.jsonl").exists()
+    assert list((tmp_path / "state" / "conversations").glob("*.jsonl")) == []
+
+
+def test_load_of_unknown_or_unsafe_id_is_none_not_crash(tmp_path):
+    store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+    # A normal missing id: no DB row, returns None (never touches the filesystem).
+    assert store.load("deadbeef") is None
+    # An unsafe id also has no DB row, so load short-circuits to None before any file IO.
+    assert store.load("../evil") is None
+
+
+def test_round_trip_with_valid_id_still_works(tmp_path):
+    store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+    rec = SessionRecord(
+        session_id="abc123def456",
+        workspace=str(tmp_path),
+        model="m",
+        mode="interactive",
+        messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+    )
+    store.save(rec)
+    loaded = store.load("abc123def456")
+    assert loaded is not None
+    assert loaded.messages[0]["content"] == "hello"
+    assert (tmp_path / "state" / "conversations" / "abc123def456.jsonl").is_file()