[Init] Initial commit - NetMesh terminal manager
Some checks failed
build-packages / resolve bundled mosh-client (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / resolve bundled et-client (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / build-macos (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / build-windows (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / build-linux-x64 (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / build-linux-arm64 (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / release (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / update Nix release metadata (push) Has been cancelled
build-packages / bump homebrew tap (push) Has been cancelled
test / lint-and-test (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Route event (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Hand reopened issue to maintainers (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Clean source issue state (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Reconcile handoffs (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Classify issue (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Claude Code smoke (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Review issue follow-up (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Publish issue follow-up (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Implement with Claude Code (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Publish implement PR (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Continue queued issue comments (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Codex review loop (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Publish Codex fix (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Clear Codex dispatch marker (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Own PR re-request Codex (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / External PR re-request Codex (push) Has been cancelled
AI automation / Poll Codex reaction / retry (push) Has been cancelled
build-et-binaries / build-linux-x64 (push) Has been cancelled
build-et-binaries / build-linux-arm64 (push) Has been cancelled
build-et-binaries / build-macos-universal (push) Has been cancelled
build-et-binaries / build-windows-x64 (push) Has been cancelled
build-et-binaries / release (push) Has been cancelled

This commit is contained in:
2026-09-13 18:24:01 +08:00
commit 3c72efcb7f
3255 changed files with 907009 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
import commandBlocklistTable from '../../../lib/commandBlocklist.json';
import { DEFAULT_COMMAND_BLOCKLIST } from '../types';
/**
* Check if a regex pattern is safe from ReDoS attacks.
*
* Rejects patterns with nested quantifiers like `(a+)+`, `(a*)*`, `(a+)*`
* which can cause catastrophic backtracking / CPU exhaustion.
*/
function isSafeRegex(pattern: string): boolean {
// Detect nested quantifiers: a group containing a quantifier, followed by another quantifier.
// Matches patterns like (x+)+, (x*)+, (x+)*, (x{2,})+ etc.
const nestedQuantifier = /\([^)]*[+*}]\)[+*?{]/;
if (nestedQuantifier.test(pattern)) {
return false;
}
// Also catch overlapping alternations with quantifiers inside quantified groups
// e.g. (a|a)+ — not always dangerous but a common ReDoS vector
const overlappingAlt = /\([^)]*\|[^)]*\)[+*]{/;
if (overlappingAlt.test(pattern)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Pre-compiled RegExp cache for default blocklist patterns, grouped by the
* shell family the pattern targets.
*
* The blocklist is a best-effort defense-in-depth measure. It is NOT a
* security boundary — determined users or sophisticated prompt injection
* can bypass regex-based filtering. The primary security boundary is the
* permission / confirmation system and OS-level sandboxing.
*/
interface CompiledPattern { pattern: string; regex: RegExp }
const compileGroup = (patterns: string[]): CompiledPattern[] =>
patterns.flatMap((pattern) => {
try {
if (!isSafeRegex(pattern)) {
console.warn(`[Safety] Skipping default blocklist pattern with nested quantifiers (ReDoS risk): ${pattern}`);
return [];
}
return [{ pattern, regex: new RegExp(pattern, 'i') }];
} catch {
return [];
}
});
const compiledCommonGroup = compileGroup(commandBlocklistTable.common);
const compiledPosixNativeGroup = compileGroup(commandBlocklistTable.posixNative);
const compiledPosixGroup = compileGroup(commandBlocklistTable.posix);
const compiledPowershellGroup = compileGroup(commandBlocklistTable.powershell);
const compiledGroups = {
common: compiledCommonGroup,
posixNative: compiledPosixNativeGroup,
posix: compiledPosixGroup,
powershell: compiledPowershellGroup,
};
const compiledAllGroups = [
compiledCommonGroup,
compiledPosixNativeGroup,
compiledPosixGroup,
compiledPowershellGroup,
];
const DEFAULT_PATTERN_SET = new Set(DEFAULT_COMMAND_BLOCKLIST);
/**
* Default-blocklist groups that apply for a shell kind, from common
* (shell-independent) patterns to per-family ones. Unknown / empty kinds
* intentionally fall back to every group so callers that cannot classify a
* session keep the strict behavior.
*/
function selectDefaultGroups(shellKind?: string): CompiledPattern[][] {
const groupNames = commandBlocklistTable.shellGroups[
String(shellKind ?? '').toLowerCase() as keyof typeof commandBlocklistTable.shellGroups
];
if (!groupNames) return compiledAllGroups;
return groupNames.map((name) => compiledGroups[name as keyof typeof compiledGroups]);
}
function checkCommandAgainstGroups(
command: string,
blocklist: string[],
groups: CompiledPattern[][],
): { blocked: boolean; matchedPattern?: string } {
const enabledPatterns = new Set(blocklist);
// Settings entries that are not built-in defaults are user patterns and
// remain shell-independent.
for (const pattern of blocklist) {
if (DEFAULT_PATTERN_SET.has(pattern)) continue;
const regex = getCompiledPattern(pattern);
if (regex && regex.test(command)) {
return { blocked: true, matchedPattern: pattern };
}
}
// Shell selection narrows the built-in entries that are enabled in the
// configured list. It must not restore a default the user removed/edited.
for (const group of groups) {
for (const { pattern, regex } of group) {
if (enabledPatterns.has(pattern) && regex.test(command)) {
return { blocked: true, matchedPattern: pattern };
}
}
}
return { blocked: false };
}
/** Cache for user-provided (non-default) blocklist patterns. */
const userPatternCache = new Map<string, RegExp | null>();
function getCompiledPattern(pattern: string): RegExp | null {
if (userPatternCache.has(pattern)) {
return userPatternCache.get(pattern)!;
}
if (!isSafeRegex(pattern)) {
console.warn(`[Safety] Skipping user blocklist pattern with nested quantifiers (ReDoS risk): ${pattern}`);
userPatternCache.set(pattern, null);
return null;
}
try {
const regex = new RegExp(pattern, 'i');
userPatternCache.set(pattern, regex);
return regex;
} catch {
userPatternCache.set(pattern, null);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Check if a command matches any pattern in the blocklist.
* Returns the matching pattern if blocked, null if safe.
*
* The caller's list remains authoritative. User patterns apply on every shell,
* while enabled default patterns are narrowed by shell kind. Unknown shell
* kinds fall back to every enabled default group.
*
* Default blocklist patterns are pre-compiled at module load time.
* User-provided patterns are compiled once and cached.
*/
export function checkCommandSafety(
command: string,
blocklist: string[] = DEFAULT_COMMAND_BLOCKLIST,
shellKind?: string,
): { blocked: boolean; matchedPattern?: string } {
return checkCommandAgainstGroups(command, blocklist, selectDefaultGroups(shellKind));
}
/**
* Apply user patterns and enabled shell-independent defaults only. This is the
* safe pre-filter for renderer metadata that does not yet know the remote shell;
* the live bridge performs the final shell-selected check after probing.
*/
export function checkCommandSafetyCommonOnly(
command: string,
blocklist: string[] = DEFAULT_COMMAND_BLOCKLIST,
): { blocked: boolean; matchedPattern?: string } {
return checkCommandAgainstGroups(command, blocklist, [compiledCommonGroup]);
}