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NetMesh/application/localVaultBackups.ts
zhaolei 3c72efcb7f
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[Init] Initial commit - NetMesh terminal manager
2026-09-13 18:24:01 +08:00

514 lines
20 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SyncPayload } from '../domain/sync';
import {
STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_LAST_APP_VERSION,
STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT,
STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_APPLY_IN_PROGRESS,
STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_RESTORE_IN_PROGRESS_UNTIL,
} from '../infrastructure/config/storageKeys';
import { localStorageAdapter } from '../infrastructure/persistence/localStorageAdapter';
import { getCloudSyncManager } from '../infrastructure/services/CloudSyncManager';
import { netcattyBridge } from '../infrastructure/services/netcattyBridge';
import { hasMeaningfulSyncData } from './syncPayload';
/**
* Snapshot the current sync data version (the integer that increments
* on each successful cloud sync). Returns undefined when the value is
* 0 (never synced) or unavailable, so the UI can fall back to timestamp.
*/
function captureCurrentSyncDataVersion(): number | undefined {
try {
const state = getCloudSyncManager().getState();
const v = state.localVersion;
return typeof v === 'number' && v > 0 ? v : undefined;
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
export type LocalVaultBackupReason = 'app_version_change' | 'before_restore';
export interface LocalVaultBackupPreview {
id: string;
createdAt: number;
reason: LocalVaultBackupReason;
/** Sync-data version at the time the snapshot was taken (the integer
* that the CloudSyncManager increments on each successful cloud sync).
* Undefined when the user had never synced yet, or for legacy backups
* persisted before this field was added. */
syncDataVersion?: number;
/** App version transition fields, only for `app_version_change` records.
* Kept for backward compatibility with already-persisted backups. */
sourceAppVersion?: string;
targetAppVersion?: string;
fingerprint: string;
preview: {
hostCount: number;
keyCount: number;
snippetCount: number;
noteCount: number;
identityCount: number;
portForwardingRuleCount: number;
};
}
export interface LocalVaultBackupDetails {
backup: LocalVaultBackupPreview;
payload: SyncPayload;
}
export const DEFAULT_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT = 20;
export const MIN_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT = 1;
export const MAX_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT = 100;
export const sanitizeLocalVaultBackupMaxCount = (value: number): number => {
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return DEFAULT_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT;
return Math.max(
MIN_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT,
Math.min(MAX_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT, Math.round(value)),
);
};
export const getLocalVaultBackupMaxCount = (): number => {
const stored = localStorageAdapter.readNumber(STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT);
return sanitizeLocalVaultBackupMaxCount(
stored ?? DEFAULT_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT,
);
};
export const setLocalVaultBackupMaxCount = (value: number): number => {
const sanitized = sanitizeLocalVaultBackupMaxCount(value);
localStorageAdapter.writeNumber(STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_MAX_COUNT, sanitized);
return sanitized;
};
export async function trimLocalVaultBackups(maxCount = getLocalVaultBackupMaxCount()): Promise<void> {
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
await bridge?.trimVaultBackups?.({ maxCount });
}
export async function getLocalVaultBackupCapabilities(): Promise<{
encryptionAvailable: boolean;
}> {
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
const caps = await bridge?.getVaultBackupCapabilities?.();
// Conservatively treat a missing bridge (non-Electron environments, early
// boot) as unavailable so callers fall back to the locked-down UI path
// instead of assuming capabilities they can't verify.
return { encryptionAvailable: Boolean(caps?.encryptionAvailable) };
}
export async function listLocalVaultBackups(): Promise<LocalVaultBackupPreview[]> {
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
const entries = await bridge?.listVaultBackups?.();
return Array.isArray(entries) ? entries : [];
}
export async function readLocalVaultBackup(id: string): Promise<LocalVaultBackupDetails | null> {
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
if (!bridge?.readVaultBackup) return null;
return bridge.readVaultBackup({ id });
}
export async function openLocalVaultBackupDir(): Promise<void> {
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
await bridge?.openVaultBackupDir?.();
}
export async function createLocalVaultBackup(
payload: SyncPayload,
options: {
reason: LocalVaultBackupReason;
syncDataVersion?: number;
sourceAppVersion?: string;
targetAppVersion?: string;
maxCount?: number;
},
): Promise<LocalVaultBackupPreview | null> {
// Intentional: an empty-vault backup has nothing to restore from, so we
// early-return instead of writing a zero-entry record. Callers that rely
// on a backup (protective-before-restore, version-change on first run)
// must treat `null` as "no safety net this time" and continue — blocking
// the user's flow on a missing backup would be worse than allowing the
// apply to proceed without one.
if (!hasMeaningfulSyncData(payload)) {
return null;
}
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
if (!bridge?.createVaultBackup) {
return null;
}
try {
const result = await bridge.createVaultBackup({
payload,
reason: options.reason,
// Default to the live cloud-sync version so every new backup carries
// it even when the caller didn't pass one explicitly. Bridge sanitizer
// drops invalid values (non-positive / non-finite), so this is safe.
syncDataVersion: options.syncDataVersion ?? captureCurrentSyncDataVersion(),
sourceAppVersion: options.sourceAppVersion,
targetAppVersion: options.targetAppVersion,
maxCount: options.maxCount ?? getLocalVaultBackupMaxCount(),
});
return result?.backup ?? null;
} catch (error) {
// The main-process bridge refuses to write backups when safeStorage is
// unavailable (VAULT_BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_UNAVAILABLE) because SyncPayload
// carries plaintext credentials that must never touch disk unencrypted.
// Callers (startup version-change, protective-before-restore) intentionally
// continue without a backup rather than blocking the user's flow, so we
// log and return null here.
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
console.warn('[localVaultBackups] Backup skipped:', message);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Thrown when a caller requires a protective backup and the backup
* couldn't be written — safeStorage unavailable, bridge missing,
* main-process rejection, disk error.
*
* Callers should surface this as a user-visible abort rather than
* proceeding with the destructive apply. Separate from "nothing to
* back up" (empty vault) which is returned as `null`.
*/
export class ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = 'ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError';
}
}
/**
* Create a protective local backup before a destructive apply (restore
* from backup list, restore from Gist revision, cloud download applied
* over meaningful local state).
*
* Returns `null` when there is nothing meaningful to back up — in that
* case the caller can safely proceed with the apply, because there is
* no local data to lose.
*
* Throws `ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError` when pre-apply state IS
* meaningful but the backup attempt failed. Callers MUST abort the
* destructive apply in that case and surface the error to the user,
* otherwise we regress the exact safety contract the backup system
* was added to enforce (the `console.error`-and-proceed pattern that
* previously swallowed safeStorage/keychain failures and continued).
*/
export async function createRequiredProtectiveLocalVaultBackup(
payload: SyncPayload,
): Promise<LocalVaultBackupPreview | null> {
if (!hasMeaningfulSyncData(payload)) {
// Nothing to protect — an empty-vault backup would produce a
// useless record, not a safety net.
return null;
}
const bridge = netcattyBridge.get();
if (!bridge?.createVaultBackup) {
throw new ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError(
'Vault backup bridge is not available in this environment.',
);
}
try {
const result = await bridge.createVaultBackup({
payload,
reason: 'before_restore',
maxCount: getLocalVaultBackupMaxCount(),
});
return result?.backup ?? null;
} catch (error) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
throw new ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError(message);
}
}
/**
* How long each heartbeat extends the cross-window restore barrier.
* Short enough that an abandoned lock (crashed window, hung task)
* clears itself quickly without user intervention. The heartbeat
* interval below refreshes the deadline as long as the caller's task
* is still running, so large vaults or slow keychain unlocks cannot
* expose a mid-apply window to concurrent auto-sync even when the
* total apply time exceeds this value.
*/
const RESTORE_BARRIER_HOLD_MS = 60_000;
/**
* How often the heartbeat refreshes the barrier. Picked to ensure at
* least two refreshes land before the current deadline would expire,
* so a single missed tick (event-loop stall, GC pause) cannot drop
* the barrier prematurely.
*/
const RESTORE_BARRIER_HEARTBEAT_MS = Math.max(1_000, Math.floor(RESTORE_BARRIER_HOLD_MS / 3));
/**
* Run `task` while holding a cross-window "restore in progress" barrier.
*
* The barrier is a localStorage key readable by every window of the same
* origin. useAutoSync reads it on each auto-sync and on each data-change
* debounce tick, refusing to push while the deadline is still in the
* future. We write a time-bounded deadline (rather than a boolean) so a
* crashed window can never leave sync permanently wedged.
*
* While the task runs, a heartbeat timer re-writes the deadline so a
* slow apply (large vault, slow keychain) keeps the barrier held rather
* than exposing a post-deadline window to concurrent auto-sync. The
* heartbeat is cleared and the barrier is released in a finally block
* so success, throw, and unexpected early-return all converge on the
* same cleanup.
*/
export async function withRestoreBarrier<T>(
task: () => Promise<T>,
holdMs: number = RESTORE_BARRIER_HOLD_MS,
): Promise<T> {
const writeDeadline = () => {
try {
localStorageAdapter.writeNumber(
STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_RESTORE_IN_PROGRESS_UNTIL,
Date.now() + holdMs,
);
} catch (error) {
// If we can't write the barrier we still proceed — the UI-side
// `isSyncBusy` guard and same-window debounce cancellation are a
// secondary defense. Better to complete the restore than refuse on
// a broken localStorage.
console.warn('[localVaultBackups] Failed to set restore barrier:', error);
}
};
writeDeadline();
const heartbeat = setInterval(
writeDeadline,
Math.max(1_000, Math.min(holdMs / 3, RESTORE_BARRIER_HEARTBEAT_MS)),
);
try {
return await task();
} finally {
clearInterval(heartbeat);
try {
localStorageAdapter.writeNumber(STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_RESTORE_IN_PROGRESS_UNTIL, 0);
} catch {
/* ignore — the deadline will expire naturally */
}
}
}
/**
* Shape of the apply-in-progress sentinel record. Persisted as JSON in
* `STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_APPLY_IN_PROGRESS` so the next session can
* distinguish "the last apply completed cleanly" from "the last apply
* crashed mid-way and the local vault is a partial mix of states."
*/
export interface VaultApplyInProgressRecord {
startedAt: number;
protectiveBackupId: string | null;
}
/**
* Returns the persisted apply-in-progress record if a previous apply
* was interrupted before clearing it. Callers (notably auto-sync) use
* this to refuse to push a partial-apply local state over an intact
* cloud copy. See `applyProtectedSyncPayload` for the write side.
*
* `null` here means "no interrupted apply detected" — either nothing
* was ever applied, or the last apply finished cleanly.
*/
export function readInterruptedVaultApply(): VaultApplyInProgressRecord | null {
try {
const raw = localStorageAdapter.readString(STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_APPLY_IN_PROGRESS);
if (!raw) return null;
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') return null;
const startedAt = typeof parsed.startedAt === 'number' ? parsed.startedAt : 0;
const protectiveBackupId =
typeof parsed.protectiveBackupId === 'string' ? parsed.protectiveBackupId : null;
if (!startedAt) return null;
return { startedAt, protectiveBackupId };
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Clears the apply-in-progress sentinel. The normal completion path
* inside `applyProtectedSyncPayload` clears it automatically; this
* export exists so the user's explicit recovery action ("I've restored
* from a backup, resume sync") can acknowledge the interrupted state
* from the UI without re-running an apply.
*/
export function clearInterruptedVaultApply(): void {
try {
localStorageAdapter.remove(STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_APPLY_IN_PROGRESS);
} catch {
/* ignore — next clean apply will overwrite */
}
}
function writeApplyInProgressSentinel(record: VaultApplyInProgressRecord): void {
try {
localStorageAdapter.writeString(
STORAGE_KEY_VAULT_APPLY_IN_PROGRESS,
JSON.stringify(record),
);
} catch (error) {
// Sentinel write is best-effort: a failure here means a later crash
// won't be detected, but does NOT compromise the apply itself.
// Log so a systematic storage outage is diagnosable.
console.warn('[localVaultBackups] Failed to set apply-in-progress sentinel:', error);
}
}
/**
* Shared "apply a remote-sourced payload safely" helper.
*
* Holds the cross-window restore barrier, snapshots the pre-apply vault
* into a protective backup, persists an apply-in-progress sentinel, and
* only then runs the supplied `applyPayload` callback. Every destructive
* apply path (startup merge, conflict resolution, empty-vault restore,
* manual Gist-revision restore) must go through this so the protections
* can't drift out of sync between the main window and the settings
* window.
*
* The sentinel closes the partial-apply-then-crash window: `applyPayload`
* writes to several localStorage keys non-atomically (hosts, keys, port-
* forwarding rules, settings). A crash mid-sequence leaves the vault in
* a state that is neither pre-apply nor post-apply, and the next
* auto-sync would otherwise push that partial state over an intact cloud
* copy. The sentinel flags "local may be inconsistent" for the next
* session; `readInterruptedVaultApply` exposes that to callers that
* enforce "don't auto-push a half-applied vault."
*
* `buildPreApplyPayload` is invoked *before* the apply to snapshot the
* current vault. Callers pass their own React-closure builder (hosts,
* keys, port-forwarding rules) because the caller owns that state.
*
* `prepareApply`, when provided, runs while the restore barrier is held but
* before the protective backup and apply-in-progress sentinel. It must not
* mutate local vault state; it returns the callback that performs the actual
* apply. This lets callers validate external state without leaving a false
* partial-apply sentinel when validation fails.
*
* `translateProtectiveBackupFailure` converts the
* `ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError` into a user-visible message in the
* caller's locale. It runs only on the thrown-and-caught path.
*/
type ProtectedApplyCallback = () => void | Promise<void>;
export type ApplyProtectedSyncPayloadOptions = {
buildPreApplyPayload: () => SyncPayload | Promise<SyncPayload>;
translateProtectiveBackupFailure: (message: string) => string;
} & (
| { applyPayload: ProtectedApplyCallback; prepareApply?: never }
| { applyPayload?: never; prepareApply: () => Promise<ProtectedApplyCallback> }
);
export function applyProtectedSyncPayload(
options: ApplyProtectedSyncPayloadOptions,
): Promise<void> {
const { buildPreApplyPayload, translateProtectiveBackupFailure } = options;
return withRestoreBarrier(async () => {
const applyPayload = options.prepareApply
? await options.prepareApply()
: options.applyPayload;
const pre = await buildPreApplyPayload();
let protectiveBackupId: string | null = null;
try {
const backup = await createRequiredProtectiveLocalVaultBackup(pre);
protectiveBackupId = backup?.id ?? null;
} catch (error) {
// Destructive apply without a working safety net is exactly the
// overwrite-without-recovery regression this module was added to
// prevent. Surface the failure to the caller; every call site
// currently aborts the apply and shows a user-visible error.
if (error instanceof ProtectiveBackupUnavailableError) {
throw new Error(translateProtectiveBackupFailure(error.message));
}
throw error;
}
// Mark the apply as in-progress. If the renderer crashes between
// the first localStorage write inside `applyPayload` and the
// successful completion below, the next session will observe this
// sentinel and refuse to auto-sync the partial state.
writeApplyInProgressSentinel({
startedAt: Date.now(),
protectiveBackupId,
});
// Only clear the sentinel on successful completion. A throw from
// `applyPayload` deliberately leaves the sentinel set: the partial
// write is still on disk, and the next session must observe the
// flag so auto-sync refuses to push the half-applied state.
await applyPayload();
clearInterruptedVaultApply();
});
}
export async function ensureVersionChangeBackup(
payload: SyncPayload,
currentAppVersion: string | null | undefined,
): Promise<{ created: boolean; backup: LocalVaultBackupPreview | null }> {
const normalizedVersion = currentAppVersion?.trim() || '';
if (!normalizedVersion) {
return { created: false, backup: null };
}
const previousVersion =
localStorageAdapter.readString(STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_LAST_APP_VERSION)?.trim() || '';
if (!previousVersion) {
localStorageAdapter.writeString(STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_LAST_APP_VERSION, normalizedVersion);
return { created: false, backup: null };
}
if (previousVersion === normalizedVersion) {
return { created: false, backup: null };
}
let backup: LocalVaultBackupPreview | null = null;
const payloadIsMeaningful = hasMeaningfulSyncData(payload);
if (payloadIsMeaningful) {
backup = await createLocalVaultBackup(payload, {
reason: 'app_version_change',
sourceAppVersion: previousVersion,
targetAppVersion: normalizedVersion,
});
}
// Only advance the stored version stamp when we actually wrote a
// backup. Two failure modes we must NOT collapse into "advance":
//
// 1. Meaningful payload + backup failed (transient keychain lock,
// disk error) — leaving the stamp unchanged means the next
// launch retries, instead of turning a transient error into a
// permanent "the version-change backup never happened" hole.
//
// 2. Non-meaningful payload at the moment we checked — on startup
// the async vault rehydrate may not have finished yet, so
// `hasMeaningfulSyncData` can return false transiently even
// though the user has real data. Advancing in that window would
// burn the one-shot upgrade opportunity; holding keeps the
// retry available on the next launch when rehydrate has
// completed (or when the user genuinely starts from empty and
// the next migration-boundary arrives).
//
// Trade-off: a user who truly starts empty and never adds data will
// hit this branch on every launch until they do. That's cheap (a
// single meaningful-data check) and strictly safer than silently
// skipping the first real upgrade backup.
const shouldAdvanceVersion = payloadIsMeaningful && backup !== null;
if (shouldAdvanceVersion) {
localStorageAdapter.writeString(STORAGE_KEY_LOCAL_VAULT_BACKUP_LAST_APP_VERSION, normalizedVersion);
}
return {
created: Boolean(backup),
backup,
};
}